Mission 647.Koblenz/Mosel.

This is the 93rd's story of the day, written from the group's own mission folder (NARA 2870512). Higher-headquarters paper is used only where it explains what the group was told to do, or where the group itself is silent.

The job

This was the group's second trip to Koblenz in four days. Ground forces had asked for the marshalling yards. The yard sat two miles northwest of the city, in the loop of the Mosel just before the river meets the Rhine at Deutsches Eck. Intelligence still counted it as live: about 2,600 wagons a day, on the Luxembourg–Rhine line and the west-bank line from Mainz to Cologne. Earlier bombs had not shut it.

Eighth Air Force Field Order 1196, 2nd Bomb Division Field Order 468, and 20th Combat Wing Field Order 242 (code name Hoppin) put the 93rd in 20th Combat Wing "B." The 448th led the wing. The 446th flew next. The 93rd flew high right on the 446th. Visual primary and PFF secondary were the same place: Koblenz marshalling yard. Last resort, if any, was a military target east of the Rhine. The S-2 briefing said there was no last resort.

The 93rd was to bomb by squadrons if they could see the ground, and as a group if they had to use PFF. Chaff start-word was Lazybones, two minutes before the IP. Visual IP word was Blue Bell. PFF IP word was Mouse Trap. Recall word was Sail. Gas load was 2,500 gallons.

Morning at Hardwick

Stations were 07:45. Engines at 08:05. Taxi 08:15. Takeoff about 08:30.

Cloud sat in the group's own assembly area, so the wing did not form at home. They formed on Buncher 1, over 1st Division country. Briefed assembly was 16,500 feet. They raised it to 17,500 because of the cloud. The 446th formed on the call sign Fearless Freddie. The 93rd formed on Ball of Fire, 1,500 feet above and in trail. Assembly started slow and still finished on time. They left Buncher 1 at 10:11.

Thirty-five aircraft went. The ordnance shop had loaded thirty-six. Hughes in 970-G is on the lead chalkboard and the load sheet; he is not on the credit memo. Treat him as the spare. There were no abortives. The 93rd was allotted one H2X set from the 425th; the Pathfinder men rode in Mitchell's 598-N.

Lt. Joseph R. Mitchell flew the lead ship, 598-N of the 330th, with Capt. C. E. Biggers as formation commander. A PFF navigator and a radar navigator rode with them. The deputy was 1st Lt. Leland C. Spencer in 075-L, a 409th crew in a 330th ship, marked deputy group, with a Mickey operator aboard. Lead and deputy each carried two 500-pound GPs and smoke bombs. The rest of the group carried twelve 500-pounders: M17s in the 328th and part of the 409th, GPs in the 329th, 330th, and the rest of the 409th.

The way in

The mission was not flown on the briefed line. The 448th, leading the wing, was off course all the way in, including over England. Over Belgium the 93rd was about thirty-five miles south of the briefed track. The IP was missed by about five miles. Spencer wrote that they were generally south of course the whole way, following the 446th, and did not make the IP good.

Fighter support met them as planned: P-51s and P-38s on the way in, P-47s at the target. Crews called the cover good, excellent, or, in one case, damn good. Nobody in the 93rd saw an enemy fighter attack. Division later noted two Me-410s in the Coblenz area about 11:50. They did not come in.

Cloud was 10/10 from about forty miles inland all the way to the target. That ended any hope of a visual run.

On the way in, McCullough's crew saw a large contrail southeast of Ghent around 11:15, about twenty-five miles off the left wing. After bombs away, Hoffman noted boat traffic on the Rhine. Sanders, two minutes past the target, counted about fifteen small boats at the Mosel–Rhine junction.

The bomb run

About fifteen miles short of Koblenz, the lead PFF set failed. At 11:52 — eight minutes before bombs away — the deputy took the run. Mitchell's crew then dropped on the deputy formation. Some ships in the lead squadron released late. The high right looked better.

Because they had come in from the south, the run was not the briefed northwest-to-southeast heading of 56 degrees. The ops summary says the run started on 356 degrees. The division bombing table records the 93rd heading as 348 degrees, bombs away at 11:59½, altitude 22,500 feet, four and a half minutes of run, autopilot, range and deflection, H2X. Air temperature at altitude was −30°C.

All thirty-five aircraft attacked as a group. They dropped 256 five-hundred-pound GPs and 144 five-hundred-pound M17s — 100 tons. Results were unobserved. Strike cameras showed only cloud. Spencer's Mickey operator thought he had a spot of town and guessed hits in the northwest, near the visual aiming point, then lost the rivers after bombs away. One 329th navigator figured the bombs ten to twelve miles south, at the next bend in the river. Pictures could not settle it.

The group flak officer reported no fire directed at this formation. A few crews noted meagre, inaccurate bursts near the Rhine or the target. That was all. No claims. No men lost.

837-X

On the run-in, 2nd Lt. Bruno Bigolin's 837-X, a 409th ship loaded with twelve M17s, had the number-two engine vibrating badly. He held his place until bombs were gone, then left the formation and feathered the engine. At 12:35 — about thirty-five minutes after bombs away — he called on VHF that he would land in Belgium. Other crews heard Brussels. Bakewell saw the ship fall off there and heard them ask if there was a field large enough.

Bigolin landed at Brussels. The crew used their escape purses for food. By 2 October they were back writing a second interrogation headed "Made Emergency Landing." The 3 October group summary says the entire crew returned safely. The 26 September credit memo still gave 837-X a full sortie. The same-day recap left his airborne and dispatched boxes blank, though the bombing column still shows twelve M17s. Same-day flashes had listed the ship missing. It was not a loss.

Home

The briefed return was 14:04. Most crews were on the ground at Hardwick between 14:25 and 14:50.

There were complaints of too much speed on the let-down over Belgium. Over the field the three squadrons looked good, then the lead squadron peeled off in a mess. The high squadron's peel-off was clean. The high-squadron leader also complained that 815-G, Andrino, flying too high and too far out on his element leader, had been a problem inbound.

Fuel burn was high because they had formed so high, but the rates were still called good: 328th 262 gallons an hour, 329th 234, 330th 273, 409th 261.

Two men came off with frostbite. Lt. Carlos Vasquez froze both hands when his heated suit quit. Beckett's crew turned in one minor frostbite case, unnamed. Baumann's sheet has messy cursive on the killed line that is almost certainly frostbite, not a death. Telephone report also counted ten aircraft battle-damaged. The recap battle-damage column is empty. Only two interrogation sheets clearly check minor damage: Benster 127-F and Digman 578-R.

No one was killed. No one was missing at the end of the day. No one bailed out. Thirty-five crews received sortie credit.

The larger day

The 93rd was the last group in the last combat wing of 2nd Bomb Division's 328 B-24s against the two Koblenz yards. 257 of those B-24s attacked. All of it was PFF. The 448th and 491st released early on malfunctions and never made a proper run. First Division went to Frankfurt. Third Division went to Ludwigshafen. The Eighth put up 1,306 heavies. Everything over Germany that day was under 10/10 cloud.

For the 93rd the day was a full effort, a blind drop, a deputy-flown bomb run, and one ship that made Brussels on three engines and came home later.

A note on the bombing records. Six crews wrote the target on their interrogation forms as the secondary ("Sec PFF" or "Secondary"). The field order made the PFF secondary the same Koblenz marshalling yard as the visual primary, so there was only one target that day. This archive therefore records every 93rd ship as having bombed the primary target, and keeps each crew's own words with its sortie.